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“The line between social and medical “disability” is not only blurry, it is 
also an arbitrary gap, susceptible to manipulation by callous politicos and 
social engineers. The ‘characteristic of disability’ lies in the eye of the 
beholder.”1
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Across cultural, physical, and political boundaries is the human desire to 
imprint the fabric of society by producing another being in one’s likeness. 
This desire transcends merely the want to reproduce, but also encompasses 
that innate need for companionship and love. Most of us can create a family 
through sexual intercourse with virtually no restrictions upon us. Some 
choose to pursue other means, such as fostering or adoption. But there are 
those who have no choice. Faced with infertility or another disability, they 
cannot reproduce through sexual intercourse and perhaps not even with the 
use of assisted reproductive technology (“ART”). The only way these 
women and their partners can pursue their right and desire to reproduce is 
through the use of a surrogate. In states where surrogacy is prohibited, these 
individuals are denied a basic human right.  
This paper argues that Article 23 of the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) is a powerful tool for citizens to demand 
that their states provide effective and appropriate assistance through 
surrogacy. Effective and appropriate assistance requires enforcing the 
surrogacy contract in a court of law and allowing compensated surrogacy. 
These two conditions would maximize individual liberty, while minimizing 
incidences of black markets and medical tourism. The CRPD is an effective 
instrument because it seeks to incite change by recognizing the ways in 
which society disables individuals. As a widely adopted international 
doctrine, the Convention also encourages international cooperation and 
collaboration. This is particularly advantageous when addressing the 
conflicts that have arisen as a result of surrogacy tourism.  
In her recent article Reproductive Rights as a Human Right: A Matter of 
Access or Provision, Sara Davies argues that one reason for the lack of 
progress in women’s reproductive health, as a human right, is the failure to 
clearly articulate the responsibilities of key actors in ensuring that women 
have access to services required to realize their reproductive rights.2 She 
suggests that what is needed is a framework that can translate decades of 
rights language into action and identify the provisions of law required to 
address women’s health. This paper seeks to establish the role and 
responsibility of the state in ensuring that the right to reproduce is a 
meaningful right for all. Drawing upon the theoretical constructs developed 
in disability law, this article articulates a rights-based claim to access 
surrogacy. The United States is used as an analytical framework, including 
the evolution of reproductive rights in the U.S. and the theory of disparate 
thoughtful support, guidance, and comments in preparation of this article. This article also 
benefited from comments by Mark Levin, Brien Hallet, and Frances Miller. Please send 
comments to lindsey.coffey@gmail.com. 
  1.     Matthew D. Martin III, The Dysfunctional Progeny of Eugenics: Autonomy Gone 
Awol, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 371, 418 (2007). 
 2. Sara E. Davies, Reproductive Health as a Human Right: A Matter of Access or 
Provision?, 9 J. HUM. RTS. 387, 387-97 (2010). 
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impact, because these concepts inform our understanding of why 
prohibiting surrogacy is discriminatory towards persons with disabilities.  
Part I provides a brief history of the reproductive rights of persons with 
disabilities. Part II introduces the CRPD. The article argues that Article 23 
of the CRPD augments the right to reproduce and should be interpreted as 
creating a positive duty on behalf of the state to enact effective and 
appropriate legislation that permits and regulates surrogacy. It then 
demonstrates that this interpretation of Article 23 is consistent with current 
laws and policies pertaining to persons with disabilities. This section 
concludes by arguing that, in the least, governments should refrain from 
prohibiting surrogacy because this violates the CRPD by unreasonably 
interfering with the right to reproduce. Part III provides an international 
comparative analysis and concludes that two conditions are necessary in 
order for the state to ensure effective and appropriate access to surrogacy—
enforceable surrogacy contracts and compensation of surrogates.  
Surrogacy legislation is a ripe issue for three reasons. First, the inability 
to procreate through traditional means affects a significant portion of the 
population. Of the 650 million people worldwide who have a disability,3
certain physical disabilities hinder a woman’s ability to engage in sexual 
intercourse or gestate a child.4 More precisely, nine out of every one 
hundred women worldwide between the ages of twenty and forty-four 
cannot conceive a child.5 Ten to fifteen percent of the U.S. population 
suffers from infertility,6 which constitutes a disability under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA).7 Although approximately eighty-five percent 
of infertility cases can be resolved through drug therapies or surgery,8 for 
the remaining cases, surrogacy is the only available option for procreation.  
Secondly, regardless of whether one agrees that surrogacy should be 
available as a matter of right, the reality remains that the current regimes of 
 3. International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Aug. 14-25, 
2006, Some Facts about Persons with Disabilities, 
http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/facts.shtml. 
 4. Among other disabilities, see text accompanying note 51.  
 5. ART Fact Sheet, EUROPEAN SOC’Y OF HUMAN REPROD. AND EMBRYOLOGY (June 
2010), http://www.eshre.eu/ESHRE/English/Guidelines-Legal/ART-fact-sheet/page.aspx 
/1061. 
6. Infertility Fact Sheet, WOMENSHEALTH.GOV,
http://www.womenshealth.gov/faq/infertility.cfm (last visited Dec. 27, 2011); The Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies (Regulation) Bill 2010 (“India’s Draft ART Bill”), Ministry of 
Health and Family Welfare et al., http://www.icmr.nic.in/guide/ART%20REGULATION 
%20Draft%20Bill1.pdf [hereinafter Draft ART Bill].  
 7. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§12102(1)-(2) (1994 & 
Supp. V 2000). See also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998) (holding reproduction 
is included within “major life activity” contemplated by the ADA).  
8. Fertility Treatment, FERTILITY-TREATMENT.ORG, http://www.fertility-
treatment.org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2011); Draft ART Bill, supra note 6, pmbl. 
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highly restrictive and/or ambiguous surrogacy laws9 have created dangerous 
and irresponsible conditions—namely, reproductive black markets and 
surrogacy tourism.  
Thirdly, the pressure for governments to address the issue of legalized 
surrogacy will likely intensify when India enacts its draft Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies (Regulation) Bill 2010 (“Draft ART Bill”).10
Currently, thousands of foreign couples are evading the legal and financial 
constraints of their home countries by traveling to India where surrogacy is 
legal and unregulated. However, a provision of India’s draft ART bill would 
require couples to produce a certificate from their home country verifying 
that surrogacy is legal in their home country and that the baby will be 
granted citizenship and entry into the home country.11 This provision will 
change the domestic and international landscape of the surrogacy industry.  
I.  THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
“Those who cannot remember the past are destined to repeat it”—George 
Santayana  
Persons with disabilities have historically been denied full enjoyment of 
their reproductive rights. The most devastating example of this is the 
eugenics movement of the first half of the twentieth century.12 Eugenics, a 
Greek word meaning “well born,” is an applied pseudo-science aimed to rid 
 9. The U.S. has no federal law governing surrogacy, which has resulted in a 
hodgepodge of state laws. State laws range from most restrictive (penalizing surrogacy 
arrangements with fines or imprisonment) to least restrictive (holding surrogacy 
arrangements legally enforceable and allowing compensation of the surrogate). Most states 
fall somewhere in the middle or have no clear legislation, rending courts ill-equipped to 
handle surrogacy litigation. See State Laws & Legislation, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN,
http://www.hrc.org/laws-and-legislation/state/c/parenting/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2011). Most 
of Europe either prohibits all surrogacy arrangements or allows only altruistic surrogacy. See
Regulation (or Lack Thereof) of Assisted Reproduction Technologies in U.S. and Abroad,
THE CENTER FOR BIOETHICS & HUMAN DIGNITY, http://cbhd.org/content/regulation-or-lack-
thereof-assisted-reproductive-technologies-us-and-abroad (last visited Jan. 25, 2012); Whose 
Child is it Anyway?, CANADIAN FERTILITY AND ANDROLOGY SOCIETY,
http://www.cfas.ca/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=790&Itemid=523 (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2012).  
 10. The law ministry has scanned the bill and it is expected to be introduced to 
Parliament in 2011 or 2012. Savita Verma, Bill to Help People Stay Single and Have Kids,
INDIA TODAY(June 13, 2010), http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/story/bill-to-help-people-stay-
single-and-have-kids/1/101327.html; Govt Likely to Implement Surrogacy Bill Soon,
DEVELOPMENT CHANNEL (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.developmentchannel.org/government/ 
parliament/1789-govt-likely-to-implement-surrogacy-bill-soon. 
 11. Draft ART Bill, supra note 6, at §34(19). 
 12. Martin, supra note 1, at 376. “Our society has a history of using sterilization 
procedures to prevent procreation by mentally retarded individuals.” In re Romero, 790 P.2d 
819, 821 (Colo. 1990) (en banc). During the eugenics movement, thirty U.S. states enacted 
statutes authorizing compulsory sterilizations. Id.
2012] A Rights-Based Claim to Surrogacy 263
society of mentally deficient and socially unfit individuals.13 Eugenics 
theory propagates the hereditary nature of “defects” and in turn the 
betterment of society rests in prohibiting such degenerates from reproducing 
their kind.14 “Defects” included epilepsy, lunacy, mental illness, mental 
retardation, reproductive challenges, and physical handicaps.15
In the United States, Charles Davenport founded the Eugenics 
Committee in 1903, a subdivision of the American Breeders Association. 
The Committee was charged to investigate heredity in the human race and 
the concepts of superior and inferior blood.16 As the first superintendent of 
the Committee, Harry Hamilton Laughlin proposed the Model Eugenic 
Sterilization Law in 1922, which became the foundation for many state 
sterilization laws.17 During the eugenics movement, thirty U.S. states 
enacted statutes authorizing compulsory sterilizations.18
The eugenics movement was not limited to the United States; Europe 
and Asia also employed eugenic-based policies, including sterilizations, 
under the guise of improving the human race.19 Nazi administrators on trial 
in Nuremberg after World War II cited the United States as the inspiration 
for its eugenics movement and Hitler’s racial purification laws.20
Forced sterilizations reached the height of popularity and legitimacy21 in 
the United States in 1927 when the Supreme Court upheld Virginia’s 
 13. Martin, supra note 1, at 372-73.  
14. See id. at 375 (describing a sentiment expressed by Theodore Roosevelt). 
 15. For example, the Wisconsin sterilization law enacted in 1913 bore the title 
“Sterilization of Defectives” and was “related to the prevention of criminality, insanity, 
feeble-mindedness, and epilepsy.” In re. Guardianship of Eberhardy, 307 N.W.2d 881, 889 
(Wis. 1981). “Idiots” and “lunatics” were forbidden from marrying in the District of 
Columbia. Jonathan Matloff, Idiocy, Lunacy, and Matrimony: Exploring Constitutional 
Challenges to State Restrictions on Marriages of Persons with Disabilities, 17 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 497, 498 (2009). Interestingly, this law remained on the books 
from 1901 until 2008 when a committee hearing in D.C. discovered the archaic language and 
overturned the law. Id. Connecticut prohibited the marriage of epileptics. HELEN I. CLARKE,
SOCIAL LEGISLATION 99 (1957).Virginia’s 1924 sterilization law authorized coercive 
sterilizations of feebleminded inmates, upheld in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).  
 16. Martin, supra note 1, at 376. 
 17. Id. at 377. 
 18. In re Romero, supra note 12. 
 19. See Martin, supra note 1, at 371; Nordic Eugenics: Here of all places,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 1997, available at http://www.economist.com/node/155244; Takashi 
Tsuchiya, Eugenic Sterilizations in Japan and Recent Demands for Apology: A Report, 3 
NEWSL. NETWORK ON ETHICS & INTELL. DISABILITY (Osaka City Univ., Osaka, Japan), Fall 
1997, at 1-4, http://www.lit.osaka-cu.ac.jp/user/tsuchiya/gyoseki/paper/JPN_Eugenics.html. 
 20. California, the state responsible for one third of the 60,000 sterilizations that took 
place in the U.S., published a favorable report on the results of sterilizations in the state that 
was later cited by the Nazi government as evidence that the sterilizations programs were 
feasible and humane. See Edwin Black, Eugenics and the Nazis—The California Connection,
S. F. CHRON., Nov. 9, 2003, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2003-11-
09/opinion/17517477_1_eugenics-ethnic-cleansing-master-race. 
 21. “[B]ecause of questions in respect to the constitutionality of compulsory 
sterilization statutes, many state legislatures withheld their approval until the landmark case 
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compulsory sterilization statute in Buck v. Bell as part of a general plan 
applicable to all feeble-minded.22 Justice Holmes wrote, “it would be 
strange if [society] could not call upon those who already sap the strength of 
the state for these lesser sacrifices … in order to prevent our being swamped 
with incompetence … It is better for all the world, if … society can prevent 
those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.”23
The atrocities of WWII challenged the ethical basis of eugenic policies 
and soon coercive sterilizations fell out of favor in the U.S. and most of 
Europe.24 U.S. courts established the right to procreate or not procreate as 
fundamental rights, “expand[ing] the cluster of rights protecting the 
physical integrity of the human body in other decisions relating to marriage, 
sexual relations, and childbearing.”25
Procreative rights26 have traditionally been interpreted negatively27-
obligating others not to interfere with one’s right to procreate or avoid 
of Buck v. Bell.” In re Guardianship of Eberhardy, supra note 15, at 889. “Within ten years 
of Buck v. Bell, 20 states passed eugenic sterilization statutes.” Id.
 22. The majority found Carrie Buck “the probable potential parent of socially 
inadequate offspring” and that she may be “sterilized without detriment to her general health 
and that her welfare and that of society will be promoted by her sterilization.” Buck v. Bell, 
274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).  
 23. Id. Carrie Buck was sterilized on October 19, 1927. Eugenics: Carrie Buck, 
Virginia’s Test Case, UNIV. OF VA. HEALTH SYS., CLAUDE MOORE HEALTH SCIENCES 
LIBRARY, http://www.hsl.virginia.edu/historical/eugenics/3-buckvbell.cfm (last visited Dec, 
6, 2011). She married twice. Her daughter Vivian did not show any conclusive signs of 
feeble-mindedness before her death at age eight. Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck’s 
Daughter: A Popular, Quasi-Scientific Idea Can Be a Powerful Tool for Injustice, NAT’L
HIST. July 1, 2002, at 12. In fact, it is reported that she performed well in school. Id.
 24. “Most competent geneticists now reject social Darwinism and doubt the premise 
implicit in Mr. Justice Holmes’ incantation that ‘…three generations of imbeciles is 
enough.’” North Carolina Ass’n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451, 
454 ( M.D.N.C. 1976). The Wisconsin Supreme Court, discussing its own state’s sterilization 
law, concluded “[s]uffice it to say, the initial enthusiasm for laws requiring eugenic 
sterilization has waned, and many of them have been repealed.” In re Guardianship of
Eberhardy, supra note 15, at 889.  
 25. In re Welfare of Hillstrom, 363 N.W.2d 871, 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
 26. The right to procreate is a fundamental, constitutionally-protected right. See Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Procreative rights are “aspects of the right to privacy 
which exist within the penumbra of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.” 
Conservatorship of Mildred, 707 P.2d 760, 772 (Cal. 1985) (citing Roe v. Wade, supra, at 
154; Eisenstadt, supra, at 453; Griswold, supra, at 485). The right to procreate, the right not 
to procreate, and the right of privacy flow “either directly from the fourteenth amendment or 
by it incorporation of the Bill of Rights, or from the ninth amendment, or through the 
penumbra surrounding all of the Bill of Rights.” In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).  
 27. A negative right is the right to be free from interference with one’s exercise of 
that right. “The First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy [[including the right to 
procreate]] is protected from government intrusion.” Griswold, supra note 26, at 483. In 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Supreme Court held “[i]f the right to privacy means anything, it is 
the right of the individual…to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions into 
matters fundamentally effecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” 
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procreation. Initially, U.S. courts considered challenges to state action that 
interfered with the right to avoid procreation. These cases involved the right 
to access abortion services and contraception.28 Later, in 1942, the Supreme 
Court revisited the Buck v. Bell issue in Skinner v. Oklahoma, and rendered 
coercive sterilizations for penal purposes unconstitutional.29 Although the 
court never explicitly overturned Buck v. Bell, Skinner was the first time the 
court defended the positive, intentional act of procreation. Justice Douglas 
proclaimed the right to procreate, “one of the basic civil rights of man,” 
which is subject to the judiciary’s strict scrutiny.30
II. THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 
When the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD 
or Convention) entered into force on May 3, 2008, it was the first treaty to 
specifically address the needs of persons with disabilities.31 The treaty was 
groundbreaking for its embodiment of the social model of disability and 
articulation of human rights within the context of disabilities.  
Frédéric Mégret outlines the significant contributions of the CRPD to 
human rights law in his articles The Disability Convention: Towards a More 
Holistic Concept of Rights and The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities or Disabilities Rights? He rightly points out 
that one of the key moments in the CRPD is when it asserts concern that 
despite the existing human rights instruments, persons with disabilities 
continue to face barriers in their participation as equal members of society 
and violations of their human rights.32 This travesty can be attributed to the 
“laissez-faire” approach expressed by previous treaties.33 In contrast, 
persons with disabilities typically require more complex social, political, 
economic, and institutional arrangements in order to enjoy their rights on an 
Supra note 26, at 454 (emphasis added). In Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, the Supreme 
Court again explained that regulations imposing a burden on the decision whether or not to 
beget or bear a child may only be justified by a compelling state interest and must be 
narrowly drawn. 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977).  
 28. See, e.g., Griswold, supra note 26 (protecting one’s right not to procreate); 
Carey, supra note 27; Eisenstadt, supra note 26. The right of a woman to choose not to bear 
children is a constitutionally protected right, as is the right to implement that choice by use of 
contraception and, subject to reasonable restrictions, to terminate a pregnancy. 
Conservatorship of Mildred, 707 P.2d 760, 772 (Cal. 1985)(citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438; Griswold, 381 U.S. 479).  
 29. The court unanimously concluded that if the state sterilizes the individual, he is 
“forever deprived of a basic liberty.” Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).  
 30. Id.
 31. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. 
Doc. A/61/611 (Dec. 13, 2006) (entered into force on May 3, 2008). 
 32. Frédéric Mégret, The Disabilities Convention: Towards a Holistic Concept of 
Rights, 12 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 261, 263 (2008).  
 33. Id.
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equal basis.34 Mégret explains that a specific instrument is needed because 
there is a dimension of experience inherent to persons with disabilities 
which almost requires the creation of new rights.35 While confirming 
existing rights, the CRPD amplifies upon, evolves from, and even departs 
from traditional expressions of human rights in creative ways required by 
the issue of disability.36 Mégret concludes that the CRPD’s most significant 
contribution is its reinvention of human rights law grounded in a plural, 
relational concept of the human in society.37
The treaty indeed marked a major shift in the way societies view persons 
with disabilities. Rather than an inherent attribute of the individual, the 
Convention views disability as the result of an “interaction between an 
inaccessible environment and the person with the disability.”38 The former 
theory is referred to as the medical model of disability. This model 
emphasizes the surgical and medical ways one might “normalize” a person 
with a disability. In contrast, the social model of disability identifies the 
environments, or systemic and attitudinal barriers assumptively inherent in 
society, that exclude persons with disabilities.39 In other words, it is society
that disables the individual.40 The Convention challenges States Parties to 
reevaluate the relational experience of persons with disabilities in order to 
construct accessible environments. Accordingly, States Parties are obligated 
to enact antidiscrimination laws, as well as eliminate those laws and 
practices that discriminate against persons with disability.41
Additionally, the Convention recognizes that women with disabilities are 
subject to double discrimination, which places them at higher risk for 
maltreatment, exploitation, and exclusion from social life.42
Acknowledgement of this reality is particularly important because 
surrogacy is a gendered issue—surrogacy is necessary when the woman is 
 34. Id.
 35. See Frédéric Mégret, The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities or Disability Rights?, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 494, 496 (2008). 
 36. Id. at 498. 
 37. See Mégret, supra note 32, at 264, 274. 
 38. W.H.O. & WORLD BANK, WORLD REPORT ON DISABILITY 4 (2011), available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/9789240685215_eng.pdf [hereinafter WORLD 
REPORT ON DISABILITY]; Backgrounder: Disability Treaty Closes a Gap in Protecting 
Human Rights, U.N. ENABLE (May 2008), http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=476.
 39. WORLD REPORT ON DISABILITY, supra note 38. 
 40. Id.
 41. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Why a Convention?,
UN.ORG, http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/questions.shtml (last visited Dec. 27, 
2011). 
 42. Women and Girls with Disabilities, U.N. ENABLE,
http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=1514 (last visited Dec. 27, 2011); Luz Angela 
Melo, Human Rights Technical Adviser, U.N. Population Fund (UNFPA), Panel Discussion: 
Cross-sectionalities of Gender, Disability, and Development: Towards Equality for Women 
and Girls with Disabilities, 54th Sess. of the Comm’n on the Status of Women, (Mar. 4, 
2010). 
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disabled, and only a woman can act as a surrogate. Because surrogacy 
occupies this fragile space where the needs of two disadvantaged groups—
women and persons with disabilities—overlap, governments must tread 
carefully to safeguard their human rights and prevent injustices. The CRPD 
calls on States Parties to challenge and modify stereotypes that burden 
progress when adopting legislation. For example, Melissa Fraser’s note 
Gender Inequality in In Vitro Fertilization: Controlling Women’s 
Reproductive Autonomy suggests that the regulation and process of 
infertility treatments subjugate women’s interests and reproductive 
autonomy, which reflects the larger societal attitude that women are the 
“second sex.”43 Proponents of surrogacy also criticize governments that ban 
surrogacy for adopting patriarchal legislation that assumes women cannot 
make informed decisions about their bodies.44
A.  “Respect for and the Family” (Article 23) 
Article 23 sets forth the standards governments shall meet to guarantee 
reproductive rights. Section 1 of Article 23 calls on States Parties to “take 
effective and appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
persons with disabilities in all matters relating to marriage, family, 
parenthood and relationships.” 45 Three rights must be protected and 
guaranteed on an “equal basis” with non-disabled persons in order to 
eliminate discrimination against persons with disabilities. Those three rights 
include the right to: (i) found a family, (ii) decide freely on the number and 
spacing of their children, and (iii) retain one’s fertility on an equal basis 
with others.46 More specifically, States Parties shall ensure that “the means 
necessary to enable [persons with disabilities] to exercise these rights are 
provided.”47 The italicized words (“effective and appropriate measures,” 
“equal basis,” and “means necessary”) function to create a state 
responsibility to eliminate discrimination.48 Mégret attributes the CRPD’s 
 43. See Melissa E. Fraser, Gender Inequality in In Vitro Fertilization: Controlling 
Women’s Reproductive Autonomy, 2 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 183, 190-91 (1998). See also Jessica 
H. Munyon, Protectionism and Freedom of Contract: The Erosion of Female Autonomy in 
Surrogacy Decisions, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 717, 722 (2003). 
 44. Munyon, supra note 43, at 726-28; Jennifer Rimm, Comment, Booming Baby 
Business: Regulating Commercial Surrogacy in India, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1429, 1447
(2009). 
 45. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 31, art. 23 
(emphasis added).  
 46. Id.
 47. Id. art. 23(1)(b) (emphasis added). 
 48. “All of these obviously appear as duties of the state rather than human rights per 
se.” Mégret, supra note 35, at 506. 
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arguable “extension” of human rights, or “human rights ‘plus,’” to its focus 
on the societal dimension of the rights experience.49
B.  A Legalized Surrogacy Industry: States Parties Have a 
Responsibility to Provide “Effective and Appropriate” Surrogacy 
Legislation  
Article 23 creates a positive duty on behalf of States Parties to allow 
access to surrogacy when it obligates States Parties to provide “effective 
and appropriate measures” and “means necessary” to persons with 
disabilities to retrain their fertility and found a family. Surrogacy is included 
within “means necessary” because of its indispensible role in founding a 
family. In other words, the obligation of States Parties to protect and 
promote the right to reproduce arguably goes beyond merely not prohibiting 
surrogacy; States Parties should establish a framework for legalized and 
regulated surrogacy.  
Access to surrogacy is indispensible to protecting procreative liberty 
because certain disabilities render it impossible for a woman to become 
impregnated through sexual intercourse and carry a baby to full term. 
Among these disabilities is infertility—encompassed by Section 12102 of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).50 Within this group are women 
who (i) are medically advised against carrying a baby, (ii) are unable to 
engage in sexual intercourse or carry a baby due to a physical characteristic, 
(iii) undergo a hysterectomy, (iv) suffer from certain cancers or diseases, (v) 
have recurrent miscarriages, and (vi) are born without a uterus.51 These are 
human conditions, not life choices. Moreover, this reality renders the 
medical model of disability inapplicable to this class of persons. It is only 
through changing the social and legal environment that reproduction 
becomes accessible.  
Providing access to surrogacy operates as an antidiscrimination measure. 
The Americans with Disabilities Act provides a model for understanding 
how antidiscrimination measures operate within the context of disabilities 
rights. The ADA mandates certain alterations—for example, a ramp to enter 
 49. See id. at 507. 
 50. Americans with Disability Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 
327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2009)). The goal of the ADA is to not 
only remove barriers but to provide equal opportunity and full participation for people with 
disabilities. Id. § 12101(a)-(b).  
 51. See also Fiona MacCallum et al., Surrogacy: The Experience of Commissioning 
Couples, 18 HUM. REPROD. 1334 (2003). Drug therapies and surgery are typically ineffective 
means of treating these conditions. Moreover, Fertility and Sterility recently published new 
findings concluding that “cycle-based fertility treatments may offer a point of diminishing 
returns for infertile couples.” James F. Smith et al., Fertility Treatments and Outcomes 
Among Couples Seeking Fertility Care: Data from a Prospective Fertility Cohort in the 
United States, 95 FERTILITY & STERILITY 79, 79 (2011). After about two to three cycles the 
chances of success may diminish. Id.
2012] A Rights-Based Claim to Surrogacy 269
a building—so that persons with disabilities can access the same facilities as 
persons without disabilities. These alterations are termed 
“accommodations,” yet it is doubtful that anyone would argue that the 
ability to enter a building is a “special” accommodation or privilege. Rather, 
these measures are meant to break down socially created barriers so that 
persons with disabilities can fully participate in society. This example is 
illustrative of the way in which society disables and enables individuals.  
In his article Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations 
as Antidiscrimination, Michael Stein, an internationally recognized 
disabilities rights expert, explains that “ADA-mandated accommodations 
are consistent with other antidiscrimination measures” in that each 
accommodation remedies a class of persons’ “exclusion from [an] 
opportunity by questioning the inherency of established … norms.”52 He 
argues that “disability-related accommodations must operate as 
antidiscrimination provisions … in order to alter social attitudes towards the 
disabled.”53 Most importantly, society must recognize that these measures 
are not just “accommodations,” they are a right.54 Similarly, surrogacy is a 
method for eliminating socially created barriers to reproduction for persons 
with disabilities.55 Barrier-free access to surrogacy should be available as a 
matter of right, not privilege or special accommodation.  
Article 23 should be read in conjunction with the Standard Rules on the 
Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities (the “Rules”),56
although the Rules are non-binding. In particular, Rule 9 strengthens the 
position that States Parties have a positive duty to undertake the necessary 
measures to eliminate discrimination in and barriers to family life and 
parenthood and enhance personal integrity. As enumerated in Rule 9, 
persons with disabilities must not be denied the opportunity to experience 
parenthood.57 States Parties should promote the right to personal integrity 
and ensure that laws do not discriminate against persons with disabilities in 
 52. Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA 
Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. U. PA. L. REV. 579, 580 (2004).  
 53. Id.
 54. Id.
 55. Congruent with other U.S. states’ measures to eliminate social barriers to the 
enjoyment of society, family life, and personal integrity for persons with disabilities. See, 
e.g., Conservatorship of Mildred, 707 P.2d 760 (Cal. 1985) (discussing the intent of the 
Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act (LDDSA)). California’s Supreme Court 
explained “it is the intent of LDDSA that services for such clients continue to provide ‘an 
unbroken chain of experience, maximum personal growth and liberty’ under ‘conditions of 
everyday life which are as close as possible to the norms and patterns of the mainstream 
society.” Id. at 771. LDDSA propagates that people with developmental disabilities and their 
families have a right to get the services and supports they need to live like people without 
disabilities. The Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act, FRANK D. LANTERMAN 
REGIONAL CENTER, http://www.lanterman.org/index.php/lanterman_act (last visited Dec. 27, 
2011). 
 56. G.A. Res. 48/96, Annex, U.N. Dec. A/RES/48/96 (Dec. 20, 1993). 
 57. Id. at 15. 
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the context of parenthood.58 This idea of personal integrity stems from the 
concept of self-determination in medical decision-making and the 
recognition that a patient’s medical decisions advance her intrinsic worth as 
an independent moral agent.59 Procreation is arguably the greatest 
advancement of one’s intrinsic worth.  
C.  Re-Expressing Existing Rights  
The Convention challenges countries to express existing rights in a 
manner that addresses the needs of persons with disabilities—it does not 
create new rights per se. Likewise, many existing laws and policies 
strengthen a citizen’s right to demand that her state provide effective and 
appropriate access to surrogacy.60 Canada, a nation discussed in Part III, is 
also bound by the Canadian Human Rights Act, which is based on the 
principal that “all individuals should have an equal opportunity to make for 
themselves the lives that they are able and wish to have, consistent with 
their duties and obligations as members of society, without being hindered 
in or prevented from doing so by discriminatory practices based on … 
disability.”61
Several European nations ban all forms of surrogacy, which is 
inconsistent with the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020. The Strategy 
calls on EU nations to (i) respect and protect human dignity, (ii) recognize 
and respect that persons with disabilities benefit from measures designed to 
ensure their independence, social integration, and participation in life of the 
community, (ii) combat discrimination based on disability when defining 
and implementing its policies and activities and adopt appropriate 
legislation, (iv) tackle obstacles to a barrier-free Europe, including 
attitudinal barriers, and (v) aim to empower people with disabilities so that 
they can enjoy their full rights.62 Further, the Strategy declares that the EU 
will support improving the availability and choice of assistive 
technologies.63
Moreover, establishing a legal framework that allows regulated 
surrogacy arrangements is congruent with current government policies that 
aid access to fertility treatment and establish rights resulting from the use of 
 58. Id.
 59. Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, 
Indelible Harms, E23BERKELEY J. GEN. L. & JUST. 18, 59 (2008). 
 60. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 50, 55. 
 61. Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., ch. 33 (1976-77) (as amended by 2008, ch. 
H-6). 
 62.  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, 
The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, European 
Disability Strategy 2010-2020: A Renewed Commitment to a Barrier-Free Europe, COM 
(2010) 636 final (Nov. 15, 2010). 
 63. Id.
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ART. First, some U.S. states have established a regulatory framework that 
recognizes parenthood based on intent to parent through artificial 
insemination, rather than genetic ties or parturition. California, Nevada, 
Oregon, and Wisconsin, for example, revised their family laws to 
affirmatively establish the paternity rights and obligations of husbands 
whose wives undergo IVF using donated sperm.64 The husband is “treated 
in law as if he were the natural father.”65 These laws facilitate family 
building through nontraditional methods by creating a presumption of 
paternity. States can similarly facilitate the creation of a family through 
surrogacy by regulating the legal rights of intending parents, surrogates, and 
surrogate children.  
Connecticut’s Uniform Probate Code III fully embodies the idea of 
“intent to parent” and recognizes parenthood for the purposes of intestacy 
and class gifts (the Uniform Parentage Act has not been modified 
accordingly) in each of the following situations:66 (i) a person who intended 
and consented to be a parent of a child created through ART, regardless of 
marriage status; (ii) a birth mother not acting as a surrogate, regardless of 
genetic ties; (iii) a person who consented to the ART of the birth mother in 
(ii) above; (iv) an intending parent whose baby is gestated and birthed by a 
surrogate, and (v) a person whose name appears on the birth certificate. A 
parent-child relationship does not exist between a child and a third-party 
gamete donor or surrogate.67
Second, several U.S. states and the U.K. have expanded access to 
fertility treatments and ART through insurance law. Fifteen U.S. states have 
passed laws requiring that insurance companies provide coverage for some 
level of infertility treatment- either that infertility treatment be provided as a 
basic health plan benefit (“mandate to cover”) or that insurance companies 
at least offer infertility coverage to purchasers (“mandate to offer”).68 The 
 64. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.061 (1979); OR. REV.
STAT. §109.243 (2009); WIS. STAT. § 891.40 (1979). 
 65. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a). Likewise, the donor of semen is treated by law as if 
he were not the natural father. Id.
 66. Elizabeth A. Bryant, Kimberly R. Willoughby & Constance Beck Wood, 
Changes to Colorado’s Uniform Probate Code, 39 COLO. LAW. 41, 43 (2010). 
 67. Id.
68. Insurance Coverage in Your State, RESOLVE: THE NAT’L INFERTILITY ASSOC., 
http://www.resolve.org/family-building-options/insurance_coverage/state-coverage.html (last 
visited Dec. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Insurance Coverage in Your State].The level of infertility 
coverage within each of these fifteen states is highly variable. For example, some of the 
restrictions are: imposing a lifetime cap (Connecticut, Maryland, Rhode Island), limiting 
coverage to married couples (Arkansas, Hawaii, Rhode Island), requiring that the patient’s 
egg be fertilized with only the spouse’s sperm (Arkansas, Hawaii, Texas, Maryland), 
specifically excluding IFV (California, New York), and requiring two years of infertility 
before insurance coverage is mandated (Arkansas, Maryland, Rhode Island). Id. See also
Daar, supra note 59, at 272. Note, however, that federal law—the Employee Retirement 
Income and Security Act (ERISA)—exempts self-insured health plans, those maintained by 
the majority of employers, from state insurance regulation. Health Insurance 101,
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twelve states that have laws requiring insurance companies to cover 
infertility treatment are: Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island and 
West Virginia.69 California, Louisiana, and Texas mandate that insurance 
companies offer infertility coverage to policyholders.70 New Jersey should 
be commended for its progressive approach to ensuring reproductive rights.  
In the U.K., although it remains very unlikely that fertility treatment is 
covered by private health insurance, the government has expanded access to 
reproductive care by providing financial assistance through the Nation 
Health Service (NHS).71 Availability of IVF treatment on the NHS is 
subject to the guidelines issued by the National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence (NICE).72 NICE advocates funding IVF when the 
couple’s chance of success is more than 10%.73 Specifically, the Institute 
recommends that a couple should be offered up to three free cycles of IFV 
or intra-cytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) if:74
1. The woman is between 23 and 39 years of age at the time of 
treatment, and 
2. One, or both, of the patients have been diagnosed with a fertilty 
problem, or 
3. The patient has been infertile for at least three years. 
Patients in the U.K. can also subsidize the cost of infertility treatment by 
participating in an egg-sharing agreement. Under an egg-sharing scheme, a 
patient can donate eggs collected from a cycle of IVF to another woman in 
RESOLVE: THE NAT’L INFERTILITY ASS’N, http://www.resolve.org/family-building-
options/insurance_coverage/health-insurance-101.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2011). 
Therefore, ERISA severely limits access to infertility coverage, even within the 
abovementioned states.  
 69. Aaron C. McKee, The American Dream—2.5 Kids and a White Picket Fence: 
The Need for Federal Legislation to Protect The Insurance Rights of Infertile Couples, 41 
WASHBURN L.J. 191, 204 (2001). 
 70. Insurance Coverage in Your State, supra note 68.  
 71. Infertility—Treatment, NHS CHOICES, http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Infertility/ 
Pages/Treatment.aspx (last visited Dec. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Infertility—Treatment].
 72. Id.
 73. Quick Facts About Fertility, HUMAN FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/infertility-facts.html (last updated Mar. 23, 2011). 
74. Infertility—Treatment, supra note 71. Nonetheless these are only guidelines and 
hence some jurisdictions only cover one cycle. See, e.g., Sophie Goodchild & Jonathan 
Prynn, Leading Doctor Wants the NHS to Fund More IVF Treatments, LONDON EVENING 
STANDARD, May 10, 2011, available at http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-
23948124-leading-doctor-wants-the-nhs-to-fund-more-ivf-treatments.do. Therefore, 
provisions of NHS-funded treatment vary across the UK. See id.; Can I Get IVF Treatment 
on the NHS?, NHS CHOICES, http://www.nhs.uk/chq/Pages/889.aspx?CategoryID=54& 
SubCategoryID=127 (reviewed Apr. 8lastreviewed Apr. 8, 2011); HUMAN FERTILISATION &
EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., INFERTILITY: THE HFEA GUIDE 10 (2007-08), available at
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Guide2.pdf.  
2012] A Rights-Based Claim to Surrogacy 273
return for a reduced price of IVF treatment.75 These schemes not only 
benefit the patients monetarily, but also supplement the shortage of egg 
donations. Egg-sharing schemes demonstrate how a state can creatively 
subsidize reproductive care in order to expand access.  
D.  The Bare Minimum: Governments should Refrain from Prohibiting  
Surrogacy 
As a “necessary measure” to ensuring the right to reproduce, 
governments should, in the least, refrain from prohibiting surrogacy.76 A 
prohibition renders procreation an empty right for infertile individuals and 
those persons with another disability that makes child bearing unattainable. 
Adopting such a policy is reminiscent of the eugenics movement. One 
cannot argue that sterilization is unethical, but then deny an individual the 
right to use the reproductive talents she has retained or the measures that 
would assist procreation. As Judith Daar articulates in her article Accessing 
Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, “while the 
eugenicists of a century ago coerced the “feeble minded” into surrendering 
their reproductive capacity through forced sterilizations, today’s practices 
act to deprive the disempowered of their capacity to reproduce by 
withholding the means necessary to produce a child.”77
The U.S. theory of disparate impact, which was developed in the context 
of employment litigation, provides a useful analogy for understanding how 
prohibiting surrogacy results in discrimination against persons with 
disabilities. When employment discrimination is alleged to be intentional, 
the court’s analysis proceeds under a theory of “disparate treatment”; when 
a neutral policy appears to produce discriminatory effects upon a class of 
individuals, courts examine the case under the “disparate impact” analysis. 
For example, in the landmark disparate impact case Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., the court focused on the “consequences of employment practices, not 
simply the motivation.”78 As Michael Stein explains, “[b]ecause disability-
based exclusion arises from subtle forms of exclusion and stigma that fall 
within the province of disparate impact theory, our focus is on that 
doctrine.”79 Examples of seemingly neutral policies that result in disparate 
impact are: (1) denial of job-protected leave under the Family and Medical 
 75. See, e.g., Egg Sharing Scheme, SALISBURY, NHS FOUNDATION TRUST,
http://www.fertility.salisbury.nhs.uk/Treatments/Pages/EggSharingScheme.aspx (last visited 
Dec. 28, 2011); Egg Share Programme, UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS COVENTRY &
WARWICKSHIRE, NHS, http://www.uhcw.nhs.uk/ivf/treatments/esp (last visited Dec. 28, 
2011).  
 76. For persons with disabilities. 
 77. Daar, supra note 59, at 73. 
 78. Griggs v. Duke, 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). 
 79. Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact, 
and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 869 (2006). 
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Leave Act, which disproportionately effects women because they are the 
sex that must gestate the child; or in the alternative, denial of paternity leave 
based on the stereotype that the male is the financial provider while the 
woman is the homemaker; (2) standardized test requirements that 
historically deny African American males entry to certain positions and 
programs; and (3) height and weight requirements that limit the female sex 
from entering into certain professions or services.80 Here, the seemingly 
neutral policy of prohibiting surrogacy for all persons in fact 
disproportionately affects persons with disabilities because only those 
persons are excluded from the opportunity to reproduce as a result of the 
prohibition.  
Furthermore, allowing legalized, regulated surrogacy is consistent with 
the principles set forth by several U.S. high courts. The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s analysis in Griswold v. Connecticut, which struck down a state’s 
prohibition of contraceptives, is on point here:  
The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within a zone of 
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it 
concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of the contraceptives rather 
than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by 
means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship. Such 
a law cannot stand under the principle, so often applied by this Court, that 
a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally 
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep 
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.81
Here, a prohibition on surrogacy is an unnecessarily broad regulation that 
wholly denies certain individuals the opportunity to procreate. Such a policy 
infringes upon one’s basic civil and human rights, and therefore violates the 
CRPD.82
As early as 1987, in the famous Baby M case, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court declared a progressive and exemplary interpretation of the right to 
procreate as: “the right to have natural children, whether through sexual 
intercourse or artificial insemination,” which includes the artificial 
insemination of another woman for the purposes of surrogacy.83 This 
interpretation of procreative liberty is consistent with and in furtherance of 
the principles set forth in the CRPD and should serve as a model for other 
jurisdictions.  
 80. Id. at 915. 
 81. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (emphasis added).
 82. Although the Court has not assumed to define “liberty” with any great precision, 
that term is not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint. Conservatorship of Mildred, 
707 P.2d 760, 773 (Cal. 1985) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954)). 
“Liberty under the law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to 
pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper government objective.” Id.
 83. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1253 (N.J. 1988). 
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III. THE COMPONENTS OF “EFFECTIVE AND APPROPRIATE” SURROGACY 
LEGISLATION
A. The Adverse Effects of Unenforceable Contracts and 
Uncompensated Surrogacy 
1. Unavailability of Surrogates- A Review of Canada and the 
U.K.
Several countries, and some U.S. states, have adopted a restrictive 
system in which surrogacy is not illegal, but is subject to debilitating 
constraints.84 These constraints include holding surrogacy contracts 
unenforceable in a court of law and prohibiting compensation of 
surrogates.85 The supply of surrogates in these jurisdictions is so 
dangerously low that the practice is virtually inaccessible.86 The vague laws 
or absence of laws regulating surrogacy in other jurisdictions force 
participants to take on greater risks and accept uncertainties, which also 
deters participation. For example, in such states, the rights of the intending 
parent(s), surrogate, and child are uncertain. The surrogate may decide to 
keep the baby and the intending parents are powerless. In response to 
inaccessibility, black markets have emerged and couples are resorting to 
surrogacy tourism.  
Canada and the U.K. demonstrate these phenomena. Both countries 
allow altruistic surrogacy, but prohibit compensation of the surrogate.87 A 
surrogate may only be reimbursed for reasonable medical expenses (after 
the production of itemized receipts) and loss of earnings in connection with 
the surrogacy in according with regulations.88 In fact, couples in the U.K. 
risk losing their parental rights to the child if a court finds that they have 
paid the surrogate beyond “expenses reasonably incurred.”89 Additionally, 
the U.K. and province of Quebec hold the surrogacy contract 
 84. For example, the UK, Canada, and Australia. See discussion infra Part III. See 
also Surrogacy Laws: State by State, supra note 9. 
 85. See Jason Burke, India’s Surrogate Mothers Face New Rules to Restrict ‘Pot of 
Gold,’ GUARDIAN (London), July 30, 2010, at 19, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/30/india-surrogate-mothers-law.  
 86. The limited compensation of UK surrogates has contributed to an acute shortage 
of surrogates in the UK, driving many couples to travel abroad. Ailsa Taylor, Experts Attack 
‘Fertility Tourism’ Industry, BIONEWS (Sept. 21, 
2009),http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_48893.asp.  
 87. Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, c. 49, § 1A (U.K.), inserted by Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (c. 37, § 36(1)) (U.K.); 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2, § 6(1) (Can.). 
 88. Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, supra note 87, c. 49; Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act, § 12§.  
 89. Denis Campbell, Couples Who Pay Surrogate Mothers Could Lose Right to 
Raise the Child, GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 5, 2010, at 9, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/apr/05/surrogacy-parents-ivf. 
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unenforceable.90 Both Canada and the U.K. have acknowledged that 
limiting payment to surrogates (as well as egg and sperm donors91) has 
significantly reduced the number of willing participants.92 Canada reports 
the emergence of a black market in which couples resort to online 
advertisements and do-it-at-home insemination kits.93 A black market is 
medically dangerous and intensifies the risks involved. This is comparable 
to the situation before Roe v. Wade was decided, when abortion was 
outlawed in many states in the U.S.94
2. Surrogacy Tourism—A Look at India  
The inaccessibility of surrogacy in countries with restrictive reproductive 
policies has resulted in the rapidly growing and controversial practice of 
surrogacy tourism.95 This refers to the act of foreign couples, generally from 
the U.S., the U.K., and Europe, traveling to another country to hire a woman 
to gestate their child. Typically, the surrogate woman is not genetically 
related to the child; she is inseminated with an embryo formed using the 
gametes of the intending parents or a third-party donor. 
 90. Surrogacy Arrangements Act c. 49, § 1A; Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 
64, art. 541. 
 91. Law Against Paying Egg Donors Drives Couples to U.S., CBC NEWS, Apr. 30, 
2007, http://www.cbc.ca/news/health/story/2007/04/30/fertility-tourism.html; Women 
Shopping for Super Sperm, CANWEST NEWS SERV., Dec. 10, 2005 [hereinafter Women 
Shopping for Super Sperm], available at
http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/story.html?id=52e43aa6-b15c-423f-a845-
13a845143e70&k=9062. 
 92. See Jayden Roberts, Desperate for a Baby, Canadians Resort to World’s Baby 
Farms, TOP NEWS (Dec. 11, 2010), available at http://topnews.us/content/230276-desperate-
baby-canadians-resort-world-s-baby-farms; Paid Surrogacy Driven Underground in 
Canada: CBC News Report, CBC NEWS (May 2, 2007), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/health/story/2007/05/01/surrogates-pay.html; Taylor, supra note 86.  
 93. See generally Sharon Kirkey, Canadian Law Driving Infertile Couples into Black 
Market: Critics, VANCOUVER SUN, Dec. 13, 2010, 
http://www2.canada.com/vancouversun/news/archives/story.html?id=1995fb4a-b64f-40dd-
b2b4-2e89b504a6ff. 
 94. “Couples are getting ripped off when their fear of penalties forces them to engage 
in surrogacy arrangements without a contract. And, surrogates are a little bit less desirable to 
the couple because they are those women who are acting out of desperation.” Paid Surrogacy 
Driven Underground, supra note 92. 
 95. Dr. Seang Lin Tan, an infertility expert at Montreal’s McGill University, 
explains that “about 50 patients a year who can find their own donors—friends or relatives. 
But the majority can’t find donors and for those who can’t find donors we send them 
abroad.” Sharon Kirkey, Desperate Canadians Resort to Foreign Surrogates,
OTTAWACITIZEN.COM (Dec. 12, 2010), http://www2.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/ 
story.html?id=f19591e1-a773-4bf2-a6b6-597c92a6ce69. The same is true for finding a 
surrogate. See Kirkey, supra note 92. One interviewee quoted in The Guardian explained, “It 
is very difficult to find surrogates in the UK. There are lots of delays and surrogates are very 
rare…So, we ended up with 10 attempts, all in India.” Burke, supra note 85.  
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India, the surrogacy capital of the world,96 illustrates how the benefits 
and disadvantages of cross-border surrogacy arrangements yield a labyrinth 
of ethical and legal dilemmas. Indian legalized surrogacy in 2002.97 With 
the exception of nonbinding guidelines set forth by the India Ministry of 
Health and Family Welfare (the Guidelines),98 the practice remains 
unregulated. Clinics are, therefore, accustomed to adopting their own 
policies with little to no government oversight. For childless couples, the 
lack of red tape enables them to navigate the Indian surrogacy market with 
ease and efficiency. However, it also leaves the industry vulnerable to 
unethical practices.99
Further, the lower cost of reproductive services in India is attractive to 
foreign couples. India offers surrogacy for about $22,000-30,000, versus 
$55,000-65,000 in the U.S.100 Nonetheless, the well-developed medical 
infrastructure and highly trained doctors assure couples that they are 
receiving quality care.101 Additionally, Indian women are considered more 
trustworthy than American women because they are less likely to smoke, 
 96. Burke, supra note 85. 
 97. Id.
 98. INDIAN COUNCIL OF MED. RES., NAT’L ACAD. OF MED. SCI., NATIONAL 
GUIDELINES FOR ACCREDITATION, SUPERVISION & REGULATION OF ART CLINICS IN INDIA,
(Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2005) [hereinafter NATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR 
ACCREDITATION], available at http://www.icmr.nic.in/art/art_clinics.htm. 
 99. Stories circulate of eggs and embryos stolen, fertility drugs sold illegally, missing 
medical records, surrogates deciding to keep the baby, as well as improper post-natal care. 
Usha Rengachary Smerdon, Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders: International Surrogacy 
Between the United States and India, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 34-35 (2009). 
 100. LAW COMM’N OF INDIA, GOV’T OF INDIA, REP. NO. 228, NEED FOR LEGISLATION 
TO REGULATE ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY CLINICS AS WELL AS RIGHTS AND 
OBLIGATIONS OF PARTIES TO A SURROGACY 11 (2009), available at
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report228.pdf [hereinafter NEED FOR 
LEGISLATION]. Donor egg surrogacy in the U.S. can cost upwards of $80,000—$120,000. For 
examples of costs advertised by clinics and agencies, see Anticipated Program Expenses for 
Gestational Surrogacy, CIRCLE SURROGACY, http://www.circlesurrogacy.com/index.php/ 
costs (last visited Dec. 23, 2011); Surrogacy Program—Financial Information on Surrogacy 
Costs, GROWING GENERATIONS, http://www.growinggenerations.com/surrogacy-program/ 
intended-parents/financial-information (last visited Dec. 28, 2011); Surrogacy—How Does it 
Work?, ADOPTION.COM, http://adopting.adoption.com/child/surrogacy.html (last visited Dec. 
28, 2011). It should also be noted that despite the cost savings, the fee surrogates earn for one 
birth is substantial—approximately equal to ten to fifteen years worth of work. Burke, supra
note 85.  
 101. Roberts, supra note 92; Amana Fontanella-Khan, India, the Rent-a-Womb 
Capital, SLATE, Aug. 23, 2010,  
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2010/08/india_the_rentawomb_capital_of_t
he_world.html; Margot Cohen, A Search for a Surrogate Leads to India, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 
2009, at W8, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704252004574459003279407832.html.  
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drink alcohol, or engage in drug use due to cultural and religious norms. 102
Some fertility clinics are even located in dry cities of India.103
Finally, in contrast to other surrogacy markets,104 clinics in India 
typically recognize the intending parents as the baby’s legal parents by 
placing their names on the birth certificate.105 Although there is no law on 
point, the Guidelines state that the birth certificate shall bear the names of 
the genetic parents of the baby.106 The Guidelines correspondingly state that 
the surrogate mother cannot also act as the egg donor and relinquishes all 
parental rights to the child.107 Therefore, in theory, the surrogate mother’s 
name should never appear on the birth certificate. Nonetheless, because 
these Guidelines are non-binding, each clinic adopts its own policy.108 The 
situation is more complicated when the baby is conceived using an egg 
donor. Clinics will either denote only the genetic father’s name on the birth 
certificate or both of the intending parents’ names.109 However, in 2009, the 
High Court of Gujarat set precedent when it granted a surrogate baby, born 
of a foreign father’s sperm and an Indian woman’s egg donation, Indian 
citizenship.110 The Draft ART bill, if enacted, would address these 
inconsistencies by granting the intending parents legal parenthood in all 
surrogacy arrangements and naming the intending parents on the birth 
certificate.  
The conflict of laws currently permeating virtually all cross-border 
surrogacy arrangements further complicates the issue of surrogacy tourism 
because the parenthood and citizenship of babies born through international 
surrogacy remains questionable. The predicaments of Baby M and the Balaz 
twins illustrate the urgent need for legislation.111 Both surrogacy 
 102. Amelia Gentleman, Foreign Couples Turn to India for Surrogate Mothers, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/world/asia/04iht-
mother.1.10690283.html; Cohen, supra note 101; Scott Carney, Inside India’s Rent-A-Womb 
Business, MOTHER JONES (Mar./Apr. 2010), available at
http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/02/surrogacy-tourism-india-nayna-patel. 
 103. Carney, supra note 102. 
 104. For example, the U.K. and Australia.  
 105. Draft ART Bill, supra note 8, at § 34.10. 
 106. NATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR ACCREDITATION, supra note 98, at ch. 3, § 3.5.4. 
 107. See id.
 108. Hillary Brenhouse, India’s Rent-a-Womb Industry Faces New Restrictions,
TIME (June 5, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1993665,00.html. See 
also examples referenced in note 109, infra.
 109. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, NEW LIFE INDIA,
http://www.newlifeindia.com/FAQ (last visited Dec. 28, 2011); MED. TOURISM CORP.,
http://www.medicaltourismco.com/assisted-reproduction-fertility/surrogacy/surrogate-baby-
birth-certificate-FAQ-089.php (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 110. See Pronoti Datta, Surrogacy Goes into Labour, TIMES OF INDIA, May 15, 2010, 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-05-15/india/28282187_1_manji-yamada-
gay-couples-law-commission-report (discussing the Balaz twins case, further explained in 
the preceding paragraphs).  
 111. See, e.g., id.
2012] A Rights-Based Claim to Surrogacy 279
arrangements resulted in the birth of babies who were deemed stateless 
orphans until their statuses were established.  
Baby Manji was the first stateless orphan born through a cross-border 
surrogacy arrangement in India. Her story sensationalized the risks inherent 
in an unregulated surrogacy market and ignited the campaign for new 
legislation.112 In the Baby Manji case, a Japanese couple, Ikufumi and Yuki 
Yamada, traveled to India to hire a surrogate.113 The arrangement was 
complicated by the intending parents’ divorce, which occurred one month 
before the baby’s birth.114 The intending mother then decided she did not 
want the baby.115 The intending father (Yamada) did want the baby and flew 
to India himself to take Manji home.116 Although the couple had used an 
Indian egg donor, Yamada was biologically related to the baby.117
Nonetheless, the Japanese embassy in India refused to grant Manji a 
Japanese passport or visa because the Japanese Civil Code recognizes as the 
mother only the woman who gives birth to the baby.118 In this case, the 
woman who had given birth to Manji was Indian, not Japanese. Yamada 
then turned to adoption. Alas, an ancient guardians and ward law in India 
disallows a single man from adopting a baby girl.119 The Indian government 
also refused to issue an Indian passport to Manji. A passport requires a birth 
certificate, which, under India law, must bear the name of both the baby’s 
mother and father.120 Because the registrars were uncertain as to who was 
Baby Manji’s mother, the Municipal Council of Anand refused to issue a 
birth certificate, which prevented the processing of a passport.121 After 
months of pleas and filings, the Rajasthan regional passport office issued 
Manji an identity certificate,122 and the Japanese Embassy issued a 
temporary visa on humanitarian grounds.123 Nonetheless, the identity 
certificate issued by the Indian government did not mention nationality, the 
 112. KARI POINTS, COMMERCIAL SURROGACY AND FERTILITY TOURISM IN INDIA: THE 
CASE OF BABY MANJI 2 n.1 (KENAN INST. FOR ETHICS AT DUKE UNIV. 2009), available at
http://www.duke.edu/web/kenanethics/CaseStudies/BabyManji.pdf. 
 113. Baby Manji Yamada v. Union of India (UOI) and Anr., (2008) 13 SCC 518, Writ 
Petition No. 369 of 2008; POINTS, supra note 112, at 2. 
 114. POINTS, supra note 112. 
 115. Id. at 2. 
 116. Id. at 5. 
 117. Id.
 118. Id. at 5. 
 119. Id.
 120. POINTS, supra note 112, at 5. 
 121. Id.
 122. Japan Gate-Pass for Baby Manji, TELEGRAPH (Calcutta), Oct. 17, 2008 
(explaining that Identity certificates are granted to people who are stateless or cannot get a 
passport from their home country), available at http://www.telegraphindia.com/1081018/jsp/
nation/story_9984517.jsp.  
 123. POINTS, supra note 112, at 7. 
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mother’s name, or the mother’s religion, thus leaving many uncertainties in 
cross-border surrogacy arrangements in India.124
In the case of the Balaz twins, two German nationals hired an Indian 
surrogate who was inseminated with an embryo formed by the sperm of the 
intending father and an anonymous Indian egg donor.125 When the intending 
parents tried to bring the twins home to Germany, India would not issue 
passports to the babies.126 The Indian government grants a passport only if a 
child’s biological parents are Indian and there is no law establishing the 
Indian surrogate or the Indian egg donor as the babies’ legal mother.127
Germany would not grant the babies citizenship and entry into the country 
because surrogacy is illegal in that country.128 The couple also tried 
adoption. However, the Central Adoption Resource Agency (CARA) in 
India initially refused on the grounds that it does not grant adopted status to 
surrogate children.129 Finally, the high court decided, in a case of first 
impression, 130 that without guidance from the legislature, and in absence of 
any law positively establishing the intending mother as the babies’ mother, 
the court was forced to conclude that the woman who gestated and gave 
birth to the babies was their legal mother.131 Hence, the babies were born in 
India to an Indian mother, and therefore were entitled to Indian citizenship 
and passports.132 After almost two years, this decision facilitated the twins’ 
eventual travel home to Germany.133
Due to the absence of any reporting system, it is difficult to gather 
accurate statistics about India’s surrogacy industry. Nonetheless, based on 
fertility clinics’ reports, surrogacy tourism to India has exploded over the 
last few years. For example, the Wall Street Journal reports that 
PlanetHospital, a medical tourism company based out of California, sent 33 
individuals/couples abroad in 2007.134 Then, within the first eight months of 
 124. Id.
 125. Jan Balaz v. Anand Municipality, No. 3020, ¶ 2, Special Civil Application 
(Gujarat H.C., Nov. 11, 2009). 
 126. Id. ¶ 4-8; Brenhouse, supra note 108.  
 127. Balaz, No. 3020, ¶ 4, 6-8, 16. 
 128. Id. ¶ 7; Dhananjay Mahapatra, German Surrogate Twins to Go Home, TIMES OF 
INDIA, May 27, 2010, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-05-27/india/28279835 
_1_stateless-citizens-balaz-surrogate-mother. 
 129. German Twins’ Father Makes Desperate Plea, TIMES OF INDIA, Feb. 27, 2010, 
http://www.timesnow.tv/German-twins-father-makes-desperate-
plea/articleshow/4339533.cms. 
 130. Balaz, No. 3020, ¶ 9. 
 131. Id. ¶ 16. 
 132. Id. ¶ 22. 
 133. Brenhouse, supra note 108. Once the babies were granted Indian citizenship and 
then Indian passports, the Indian government provided them with exit permits so that they 
may travel home to Germany. Mahapatra, supra note 128. German authorities finally agreed 
to provide the necessary travel documents after the Balazs went through inter-country 
adoption. Id.
 134. Cohen, supra note 101.  
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2009, the company sent 600 individuals/couples abroad—all but seven 
traveled to India.135 The surrogacy industry in India is worth approximately 
$5.4 million per year136 but projections for 2012 estimate that profits will 
reach $2.3 billion.137
Surrogacy tourism has resulted in additional opposition to the practice of 
surrogacy. Particularly in India, where surrogates are often from 
impoverished rural communities, there are concerns about exploitation and 
the unequal bargaining power of surrogate women.138 The fear is that 
women engage in surrogacy out of desperation, rather than for altruistic or 
well-informed reasons.139 Additionally, from the perspective of the home 
state, creating a system that encourages surrogacy tourism is irresponsible 
because it ignores the needs of its citizens. Persons with disabilities and the 
surrogates’ host states are left to bear the burden of fertility treatment. 
Legislatures have been criticized for allowing surrogacy tourism to be a 
method by which they can avoid legislating issues involving ART.140 As 
previously mentioned, this avoidance may soon be thwarted if India’s draft 
ART bill, requiring that couples produce a certificate validating that 
surrogacy is legal in their country,141 becomes law. Couples will likely put 
more pressure on their state legislatures to pass new or updated surrogacy 
laws.
Several countries have begun addressing surrogacy tourism through new 
or updated laws. India’s draft ART bill is likely to be introduced to 
Parliament by 2012.142 In addition to the previously mentioned provisions,143
 135. Id.
 136. NEED FOR LEGISLATION, supra note 100. 
 137. Brenhouse, supra note 108. 
 138. Smerdon, supra note 99, at 51-56; Rimm, supra note 44, at 1444-45, 1448 
(explaining that because the controlling party has the power to control the flow of 
information, legal scholars worry that the intending parents may try to mislead or unduly 
influence the surrogate); Carney, supra note 102; Fontanella-Khan, supra note 101. 
 139. Cohen relays stories of women who acted as surrogates out of desperation, 
including debt and an alcoholic husband. Cohen, supra note 101. One woman conveyed that 
acting as a surrogate was a better option than selling her kidney. Id. See also Carney, supra
note 102. Carney reports that one twenty-six year old surrogate told him “she opted for a 
Delhi clinic that recruits educated surrogates and doesn’t cloister them after she learned that 
some clinics hire ‘basically the very, very poor, strictly doing it for the money.” Id. Even in 
the U.S., Munyon discusses how the court in the Baby M case invalidated surrogacy 
arrangements on policy concerns of the surrogate being coerced by the prospect of making 
money. Munyon, supra note 43, at 730 (citing In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1241 (N.J. 
1988)). 
 140. See G. Pennings et al., ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law 15: Cross-border 
Reproductive Care, 23HUM. REPROD. 2182, 2183 (2008). As will be discussed briefly infra,
after a glimpse at the waterfall of complex issues that could potentially result from allowing 
surrogacy one can understand why a state would be inclined to simply ban surrogacy.  
 141. Draft ART Bill, supra note 8, at § 34.19 
 142. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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India’s law seeks to minimize the potential for exploitation. Some 
exemplary safeguards include: creating a national registry,144 requiring a 
separation between the roles and responsibilities of ART clinics and the 
ART banks,145 limiting who can act as a surrogate (women between 21 and 
35, with at least one previous child of her own),146 restricting a surrogate to 
five live births (including her own children),147 and requiring that intending 
parents provide the surrogate with health insurance during the term of the 
arrangement.148
Taking a different approach, Queensland, Australia recently enacted a 
new altruistic surrogacy law that punishes couples who travel overseas to 
take part in a commercial surrogacy with a $110,000 fine or two years 
imprisonment.149 However, experts are urging State Parliament to reconsider 
the new surrogacy laws that they say will lead to infertile couples lying to 
authorities, friends, and family about their children’s births.150 Canada has 
seen this happen with couples who travel to the U.S. for ART procedures 
and then simply lie to authorities.151
In recognition of the adverse affects of Canada’s restrictive surrogacy 
law, the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) has advocated for allowing 
broader rules regarding surrogate compensation.152 The CBA specifically 
remarked that prohibiting compensation of surrogates is likely to have a 
negative impact on the availability of ART and encourages informal 
arrangements without the benefit of legal advice.153
 143. For example, holding the surrogacy contract enforceable, requiring a certificate 
from the intending parents’ home country, and requiring the surrogate relinquish all rights to 
the child and the intending parents are bound to accept the child.  
 144. Draft ART Bill, supra note 8, at § 3. 
 145. Compare id. § 13.3-13.5 and id. §§ 20-25 with id. § 26 (demonstrating that ATR 
clinics are to perform only medical services, such as the artificial insemination, and ART 
banks are responsible for recruiting surrogates. The purpose of this separation is to ensure 
that doctors are solely concerned with medicine, and not profits.).  
 146. Id. § 34.5-34.6. 
 147. Id.
 148. Id. § 34.2. 
 149. Surrogacy Act 2010 (Queensl.), ch 4 pt 1, 54-56 (Austl.), available at 
www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/ACTS/2010/10AC002.pdf.
 150. New Surrogacy Law Will “Make Mums Lie,” DAILY TELEGRAPH (Austl.), Jan. 
22, 2011, http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/new-surrogacy-law-will-make-mums-lie/story-
fn6bmg6l-1225992594035. “University of Technology Sydney law professor Jenni Millbank 
said that couples who were desperate to have a child would still seek commercial surrogates 
overseas and simply lie about it when they return home.” Id.
 151. Datta, supra note 110.  
 152. CANADIAN BAR ASS’N, REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENDITURES UNDER THE ASSISTED 
HUMAN REPRODUCTION ACT 1, 4-7 (Sept. 2007), available at
http://www.cba.org/CBA/sections_health/pdf/reimbursement.pdf. 
 153. Id. at 1. 
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Similar to Canada, the U.K. launched a three-month public consultation 
concluding in April 2011 on compensation of sperm and egg donors.154
Fertility experts warned that due to the drastic lack of gamete donors, 
women were resorting to importing sperm, medical tourism, and do-it-
yourself insemination kits bought on the internet.155 The current policy in 
the U.K. permits reimbursement for loss earnings and expenses, but not for 
inconvenience.156 The Human Fertilisation Embryology Authority is 
considering increasing the allowable reimbursement of donors to include 
inconvenience, and the consolation survey also asked the public if the 
Authority should change the law to allow compensation.157 The Authority is 
scheduled to present the findings and its decision on compensation and 
benefits in kind on October 19, 2011. 158 These unfavorable results, and the 
potential solution of compensation, are also relevant to the practice of 
surrogacy.  
B. The Benefits of “Effective and Appropriate” Surrogacy 
Legislation 
An effective and appropriate legal framework requires (1) enforcing 
surrogacy contracts in a court of law and (2) not prohibiting compensation 
of surrogates. This framework is optimal because it maximizes individual 
procreative liberty while minimizing the prevalence of black markets and 
cross-border surrogacy. A legalized and regulated surrogacy industry also 
provides protections for all parties, sets standards of practice, guarantees 
oversight of the industry, and provides a forum for redress of abuses. 
1. Enforcing the Surrogacy Contract 
Several benefits flow from enforcing the surrogacy contract. First, the 
rights and responsibilities of each party are known and clearly defined, 
which reduces risks. Arrangements absent enforceable contracts threaten the 
family unit with possible disintegration, causing greater emotional and 
 154. Donating Sperm and Eggs: Have Your Say, HUMAN FERTILIZATION &
EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., http://www.hfea.gov.uk/5605.html (last updated Jan. 20, 2011). 
 155. Kate Kelland, Britain Wants Ideas to Boost Egg, Sperm Donation, REUTERS, Jan. 
17, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/17/us-fertility-britain-
idUSTRE70G00R20110117. 
 156. HFEA Launches Public Consultation on Sperm and Egg Donation, HUMAN 
FERTILIZATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., Jan. 17, 2011, http://www.hfea.gov.uk/6285.html. 
 157. Donation Review Web Questionnaire, HUMAN FERTILIZATION & EMBRYOLOGY 
AUTH., at 2, http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/2011-02-08-Donation_review-website-
questionnaire.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2011). Lisa Jardine, chair of the HEFA, explains that 
the HEFA wants to make sure it has the best policies in place so that there are no 
unnecessary barriers in the way of those wishing to donate while still protecting those who 
are born as a result of the donation. Kelland, supra note 155. 
 158. Donating Sperm and Eggs: Have Your Say, supra note 154. 
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psychological stress.159 When the surrogacy contract is enforceable, the 
names of the intended parents are put on the birth certificate, the intended 
parents inherit all rights and responsibilities of parenthood, and the 
surrogate retains no rights as a legal mother.160
Second, an enforceable contract provides important protections for the 
surrogate. She is afforded avenues for redress if she is subjected to abusive 
or exploitative behavior. The same is true if the pregnancy encounters 
complications or the intending parents reject acceptance of the baby, which 
may occur when the baby is born with a disability.161 Also, the parties can 
contract to provide additional benefits, such as health insurance coverage 
and pre and post-natal care.  
Third, with guidance from the legislature, courts are better equipped to 
interpret surrogacy contracts. The “court is not an appropriate forum for 
making policy in such a sensitive area.”162 There are inherent limitations to 
any case, which make the extrapolation of judicially-made policy too 
risky.163 Moreover, the advantage of unambiguous laws and consistent 
outcomes is that individuals are on notice of their rights and responsibilities 
and the consequences of their actions. They can, therefore, conform their 
behavior to the expectation of the law in order to produce the outcome they 
desire.  
Finally, holding the surrogacy contract legally binding remedies some of 
the concerns regarding the rights of the child. Under Article 7 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), “immediately after birth” a 
child shall have the right to acquire a nationality and to be known and cared 
for by her parents.164 The CRC also protects the child’s right to be free from 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with her privacy, family, or her right not 
to be separated from her parents.165 This is particularly relevant in cross-
border surrogacy arrangements where conflicts of laws (or absence of laws) 
between the host and home country complicate issues of parenthood and 
citizenship. For example, in the case of Baby Manji, the surrogate baby 
arguably had three mothers—the intended mother who had contracted for 
 159. This is particularly true when the intending mother is not biologically related to 
the baby. In the famous case of Baby M, the surrogate mother, who was also biologically 
related to the child, decided to keep the baby. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1236-37 (N.J. 
1988). The New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated the surrogacy contract and recognized the 
surrogate as the baby’s legal mother. Id. at 1264.  
 160. If the surrogate changes her mind and decides she wants to keep the baby, a court 
will interfere and order the surrogate to release the baby to the intending parents. See, e.g.,
Draft ART Bill, supra note 8, at § 34.4 (surrogate to relinquish rights); see also id. § 34.11 
(intending parents must accept the surrogate baby). 
161. Id. § 34.11.  
 162. In re Guardianship of Eberhardy, 307 N.W.2d 881, 895 (Wis. 1981). 
 163. Id.
 164. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 7, Annex, U.N. 
GAOR, Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).  
 165. Id. arts. 8, 9. 
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the surrogacy, the egg donor, and the gestational surrogate—yet legally she 
had none. 166 Enforcing the terms of the contract makes certain that upon 
birth the baby will have the same citizenship as her identifiable parents with 
whom she will reside.167
2. Compensating the Surrogate 
Allowing compensation ensures that there are willing surrogates so that 
access to surrogacy is a meaningful right. Women report choosing to 
become a surrogate for many reasons, including the fee, empathy for 
childless couples, enjoyment of pregnancy, and a sense of enhanced self-
esteem.168 While the emotional and psychological reasons may be very 
strong, jurisdictions that allow compensation have a higher number of 
surrogates than states that do not allow compensation.169
The most widely cited reason for prohibiting commercial surrogacy is 
that the exchange of money creates a baby market that transforms women’s 
bodies and children into commodities.170 However, this is a simplistic and 
assumptive view of surrogacy. First, opponents fail to recognize that a baby 
market already exists—money currently exchanges hands between 
intending parents, hospitals, doctors, fertility clinics, and pharmaceutical 
companies.171 The same is true of adoption and organ procurement.172
Although these practices are widely cited as favorable support for the 
prohibition of commercial surrogacy, they are also examples of systems in 
 166. POINTS, supra note 112 (discussed in Part III A(2)). 
 167. See, e.g., Draft ART Bill, supra note 8, § 35.  
 168. Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating Rough Waters: An 
Overview of Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 21, 30-31 (2005). 
 169. Compare note 92 with reports from jurisdictions such as the U.S., India, and 
Israel. Further, a review of jurisdictions that allow compensated gamete donation is also 
convincing. No nation has a pool of donors anywhere near the size of that in the United 
States, where compensation is not prohibited. Peggy Orenstein, Your Gamete, Myself, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2007 (Magazine), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/magazine/15egg-
t.html?pagewanted=all. See also Robyn Nazar, The Value of an Egg Donation, AM.
FERTILITY ASS’N, (June 30, 2011),http://www.theafa.org/article/the-value-of-an-egg-
donation/. 
 170. For example, The Vancouver Sun reports that Margaret Somerville, founding 
director of Montreal’s McGill Centre for Medicine, Ethics and Law, says, “what bothers me 
so much is that we are totally commercializing, depersonalizing and de-humanizing the most 
intimate of human relationships, that of parents and children.” Kirkey, Desperate Canadians 
Resort to Foreign Surrogates, supra note 95.  
 171. Carole Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M,
30 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 67. See also Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in 
the Market for Babies, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203, 211 (2009); Michele Goodwin, The 
Free-Market Approach to Adoption: The Value of a Baby, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 61, 65 
(2006). 
 172. See Goodwin, supra note 171(explaining how the U.S. adoption processes, once 
based on the altruistic child welfare model, have morphed to reflect the desires of would-be 
parents and have exposed children to the free-market dynamics).  
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which only the supplier is unpaid, while the middlemen (doctors, lawyer, 
hospitals, etc.) profit. (That being said, the next section proceeds to 
distinguish between organ donation and surrogacy as further support of why 
surrogacy should be compensated.) It remains relevant, nonetheless, that 
opponents often feel it is wrong to mix money and procreation when in 
reality this is happening all of the time. 
Second, the discourse of those who oppose commercial surrogacy on the 
ground that it commodifies women’s bodies is the exact discourse that 
represses women and perpetuates the stereotype of women as baby-
makers.173 The fee paid to a surrogate woman is in recognition of and 
compensation for her services and sacrifices. It is in exchange for the 
surrogate refraining from certain activities (smoking, drinking, sexual 
contact), engaging in certain activities (going to doctor appointments), 
enduring discomfort (morning sickness, hormonal changes, the birth), and 
undergoing IVF and hormone treatment—it is not a value paid for the life of 
a baby. Not compensating the surrogate woman devalues and under-
appreciates her commitment. To assert that a woman should voluntarily 
undergo these sacrifices out of “the goodness of her heart” reinforces the 
stereotype that women’s role in society is that of child-bearer.174
Lastly, the argument that commercial surrogacy commodifies women’s 
bodies and procreation misconstrues the nature of the relationship between 
the surrogate and the intending parents. Opponents tend to paint a picture of 
a wealthy white family choosing to engage a poorer surrogate for voluntary 
reasons, such as convenience and vanity.175 This portrayal is false. Intending 
couples turn to surrogacy as a last resort after years of emotional and 
financial sacrifice.176 They sell their homes, forgo vacations, and commit 
 173. Courts and legal scholars who reject commercial surrogacy as contrary to public 
policy often express a concern that it will reinforce a perception of women as “baby-makers” 
and promote the view of children as marketable goods. Rimm, supra note 44, at 1444. The 
flaw in this argument is similar to the contradiction inherent in society’s acceptance of the 
fact that men can and do donate sperm for financial gain, yet society feels that women should
express some altruistic reason for donating their reproductive material. See Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, Foreword, Show Me the Money: Making Markets in Forbidden Exchange, 72 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. i, x (2009). 
 174. One might argue that it is an anomaly to pay a risk premium for other jobs but 
then not pay a surrogate for her demanding (twenty four hours a day, seven days a week) 
services. 
 175. Rimm, supra note 44, at 1446 (discussing the concern that a Brave New World 
scenario will emerge as a result of surrogacy). Munyon discusses how one reason the court 
invalidated the surrogacy contract in the Baby M case was out of fear for the potential class 
distinctions, stating “surrogacy will be used for the benefit of the rich at the expense of the 
poor.” Munyon, supra note 43, at 730 (citing In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 
1988)). 
 176. A U.K. study found that couples had considered surrogacy only after a long 
period of infertility or when it was the only option available. MacCallum, supra note 51. See 
also Carney, supra note 92 (citing one couple who turned to India as a “final stage of an 
expensive and emotional quest for genetic parenthood—their last option after a series of 
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years to trying to get pregnant, only to find their last hope in the help of 
another woman. Women with infertility have been shown to suffer from 
severe depression, comparable to cancer patients, and almost half of all 
infertile women report infertility to be the most devastating experience of 
their lives. 177
To subdue the worry that the commoditization of women’s bodies and 
baby making is a necessary consequence of a regulated commercial 
surrogacy industry, consider the recounts reported by Elly Teman. In 
Birthing A Mother: The Surrogate Body and Pregnant Self, Elly Teman 
narrates the experiences of twenty-six surrogates and thirty-five intending 
mothers in Israel, where compensated surrogacy is legal and regulated.178
Israeli surrogates, unlike their U.S. counterparts, are not stigmatized by 
negative connotations that flow from seeking and receiving compensation 
for reproductive services.179 Hence, they are more upfront from the 
beginning about their financial motivations.180 But, as one surrogate puts it, 
“surrogacy begins with the money but it doesn’t end with the money.”181
Teman concludes that although the surrogacy arrangement began as a 
commercial exchange, surrogates came to shift their understanding of it as a 
gift exchange.182 Another surrogate recounted, “From a certain point 
onwards, even if I had won the lottery I would have continued, because the 
money stopped having the same meaning that it did in the beginning.”183
These narratives demonstrate that a profitable surrogacy industry exists 
where the relationships between the surrogates, intending parents, and 
children are much deeper than a mere commercial transaction.  
failed fertility treatments”); Burke, supra note 85 (reporting that one couple turned to India 
after a “13 year struggle”). 
 177. INFERTILITY COUNSELING—A COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK FOR CLINICIANS 
(Sharon N. Covington & Linda Hammer Burns eds., 2d ed. 2006). See id. at 98 (comparing 
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a. Surrogacy v. Organ Donation  
Opponents often reference the prohibition of the sale of organs and baby 
selling as support for the prohibition of commercial surrogacy.184 However, 
surrogacy is distinguishable from both practices in ways that fail to justify a 
full ban on compensation. The first difference is one of buying versus 
renting. Organ donation is permanent, whereas surrogacy services are 
temporary. In surrogacy, both the use of the body and the promise to refrain 
from/engage in certain activities are temporary. Second, there is the 
renewability aspect. Gamete donation and gestational services are activities 
that can be done more than once. In contrast, when you donate an organ, 
you do not grow another one in its place. 
Third, unlike organ procurement, surrogacy is a service rather than a sale 
of goods. Especially in the case of gestational surrogacy, which is most 
common, the surrogate is not contributing any part of her genetic material or 
giving away any part of her body. Rather, she is choosing to use her body in 
a particular way.185 Moreover, she is using her body in a natural way, and 
many surrogates have already experienced pregnancy and childbirth with 
their own children. 
Fourth, organ donation arguably carries even heavier emotional and 
psychological consequences than surrogacy, particularly in situations where 
the donor is deceased. Some of the additional stresses that are relevant to 
the organ donation of a deceased individual include: religious beliefs about 
the treatment of the body after death and the afterlife, family members’ 
emotions, societal ideas of respect for the deceased, and concern about 
establishing the donor’s intent. This is not to underestimate the emotions 
involved in a surrogacy arrangement. However, it is worth noting that 
several studies disprove critics’ concern that surrogacy arrangements result 
in negative psychological affects.186
 184. Rimm, supra note 44, at 1436. Rimm also concludes that these public policy 
arguments are not convincing enough to compel a full ban on commercial surrogacy in India. 
Id. at 1449-50. 
 185. One could argue that this is similar to professional athletes and models.  
 186. It has been found that surrogate mothers do not generally experience major 
problems in their relationship with commissioning couples in handing over the baby or from 
the reactions of those around them. Vasanti Jadva et al., Surrogacy: The Experiences of 
Surrogate Mothers, 18 HUM. REPROD. 2196 (2003). The emotional problems experienced by 
some appeared to lessen over time. Id.; See also Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 168, at 
31(noting that surrogate mothers generally report being quite satisfied with their experience 
as surrogates). A study comparing families created through surrogacy and families created 
through natural reproduction found that families created through surrogacy indicted greater 
psychological well-being and adaptation to parenthood. See Susan Golomboket et al., 
Families Created Through Surrogacy Arrangements: Parent-Child Relationships in the 1st
Year of Life, 40 DEV. PSYCHOL. 400 (2004). In addition, the absence of a genetic and/or 
gestational link between parents and their child does not appear to have a negative impact on 
the parent-child relationships or the psychological well-being of mothers, fathers, or child at 
age 3. S. Golombok et al., Non-Genetic and Non-Gestational Parenthood: Consequences for 
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b. Surrogacy v. “Baby-Selling”  
One might argue that, ultimately, the product of the surrogacy 
arrangement results in the sale of a good—the baby—which amounts to 
baby selling, a practice that is socially and legally forbidden.187 However, 
surrogacy is distinguishable from baby selling because the assumptions 
upon which baby selling prohibitions rest are not relevant in surrogacy 
arrangements. The goal of baby selling prohibitions is to prevent a baby 
black market by eliminating financial incentives when making childbearing 
decisions about a child already conceived.188 In other words, the legislature 
did not want a mother to sell her baby because of financial pressures, when 
she might otherwise choose to abort or keep the baby. Here, the purpose of 
the surrogacy arrangement is to create a baby that will join the intending 
parents’ family. More importantly, assuming a genetic relationship exists 
between at least one of the intending parents and the baby, one can argue 
that the intending parents cannot buy what is already theirs. Rather, if the 
intended parents created the embryo, they are giving the embryo to the 
surrogate only to care for it while it develops. The surrogate is providing a 
service akin to the service provided by wet nurses of the past.189
Parent-Child Relationships and the Psychological Well-being of Mothers, Fathers and 
Children at Age 3, 21 HUM. REPROD. 1918 (2006). Research presented at an annual 
conference of the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology revealed that 
intending parents have better parenting skills and show more warmth towards their children 
than those in non-surrogacy families. Research Shows Surrogacy Fears Unfounded,
BIONEWS (Progress Educational Trust, London, U.K.), July 1, 2002, available at
http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_11396.asp. Additional research presented years later at the 
same conference found that surrogate children are psychologically well and revealed no 
difference in self-esteem. Surrogate Children Are Psychologically Well: Study, AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESSE, July 5, 2008, available at
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hsVjzHODQfj9pEV3qZew2VbQNrsg. In addition, it 
is argued that the harm to maternal bonds arising from surrogacy is merely symbolic. 
Munyon, supra note 43, at 734. Additionally, in her study of twenty-six surrogates and thirty 
-ive intending mothers in Israel, Elly Teman reports that Israel has succeed in creating a 
regulatory framework that, rather than threatening the family, reaffirms it. TEMAN, supra
note 178, at 289. The institutions work toward the singular goal of creating only one mother. 
Id.
 187. In Gloria Banks’s article discussing a commercial organ transplant system, she 
explains that states must first decide whether the use of human sperm and eggs procured by 
donation or sale constitutes a transfer of a “human life” akin to “baby selling” prohibited by 
existing law and policy. Gloria Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society’s 
Most Vulnerable Participant in a Commercialized Organ Transplant System, 21 AM. J. L. &
MED. 45, 50-51 (1995).  
 188. See Abby Brandel, Legislating Surrogacy: A Partial Answer to Feminist 
Criticism, 54 MD. L. REV. 488, 502 (1995). 
 189. Where the birth mother and genetic mother are the same, courts and legislatures 
have a harder time distinguishing the surrogacy arrangement from “baby-brokering.” Rimm, 
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Governments could choose to go beyond facilitating surrogacy 
arrangements and provide financial support. For example, nations that offer 
universal health care could cover the costs of the ART procedures in 
connection with the surrogacy arrangement and offer subsidies for payment 
of the surrogate. This paper does not delve into this possibility beyond 
acknowledging that it is an important issue for legislatures to consider. 
Regardless of whether insurance plans cover of the cost of compensating the 
surrogate, a state should refrain from prohibiting the intending couple from 
compensating the surrogate.  
C.  Proportionality—The Weighing Game  
Generally, citizens are protected from arbitrary interference with the 
exercise of their human rights.190 When the government does interfere, the 
question becomes whether it is doing so rationally and in the public 
interest.191 Here, although a full ban on surrogacy is an unnecessarily broad 
state regulation, certain restrictions on surrogacy may be justified on public 
policy grounds or to protect the rights of others. For example, limiting 
surrogacy to cases of medical necessity192 would address several of the 
concerns voiced by opponents of surrogacy. First, this provision would 
minimize the potential for individuals to pursue surrogacy for superficial 
reasons, such as convenience, vanity, and career goals.193 Second, it would 
likely equalize the bargaining power of the intending couple and the 
surrogate because both parties would be indispensible to the arrangement.  
Another limitation that legislatures may consider is requiring that at least 
one of the intending parents is genetically related to the baby (or at least in 
cases where that is possible). This provision, in conjunction with the 
medical necessity limitation, addresses the very contentious concern that 
sex and gamete selection operate as modern day eugenics practices. 
Together these restrictions would prevent intending couples from exploiting 
surrogacy as an opportunity to design the “perfect” baby.194 Also, requiring 
that one of the intending parents be genetically related to the child is 
directly in furtherance of the right to procreate. Otherwise, opponents have a 
stronger case to advocate that intending parents should alternatively adopt 
or foster a child.  
 190. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), art. 17, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(Dec. 16, 1966). 
 191. Alison Barnes & Michael McChrystal, The Various Human Rights in Healthcare,
HUM. RTS., Fall 1998, at 12, 13. 
 192. Medical necessity may exclude menopausal women. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. FOR 
HEALTH & CLINICAL EXCELLENCE, FERTILITY: ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (UPDATE) §
4.1.2(a) (2010), available at www.nice.org.uk/nicemedia/live/12157/48617/48617.pdf.
 193. TEMAN, supra note 178, at 2; Rimm, supra note 44. 
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CONCLUSION
Elly Teman makes two striking comments in the introduction to Birthing 
a Mother. First, by threatening the understanding of families as biological 
facts, surrogacy reveals instead that families are social constructs.195 And 
second, surrogacy constructs families through a marketplace, making them a 
matter of choice rather than fate.196 “Social constructs” and “choice” are the 
operative words here. Disability is a function of socially created attitudinal, 
physical, and legal barriers. By questioning the assumptions founding these 
boundaries, society can eliminate discrimination against persons with 
disabilities, including in the realm of reproductive choice.  
The first ever World Report on Disability is dedicated to the “moral duty 
to remove barriers to participation for people with disability and to invest 
sufficient funding and expertise to unlock their vast potential.”197 Under 
Article 23, individuals can demand that their states take effective and 
appropriate measures, as well as provide the means necessary, to ensure that 
they retain their fertility and found a family. Surrogacy enables certain 
individuals to retain their fertility and reproduce. Accordingly, governments 
should fulfill their Article 23 obligations by instituting a legal framework 
that defines the relationships between the surrogate, intending parent, and 
child, enforces the surrogacy contract, and allows compensation of the 
surrogate. These conditions would maximize individual procreative liberty, 
while simultaneously minimizing incidences of black markets, surrogacy 
tourism, and the potential for unethical conduct.  
 195. TEMAN, supra note 178, at 7. 
 196. Id.
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